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NOTE AND COMMENT.
DEPOSITORS' CHECKS IN PAYAENT OF MATURED OBLIGATIONS HaL BY
DRAWrx BANK AS PiP1I-INMC.-Since the case of New York County Bank I.
Massey, i92 U. S. 138, there has been no doubt as to the right of a debtor of
a bankrupt's estate to exercise the right of set-off as preserved by § 68a of
the Bankruptcy Act. In that case it was laid down dearly that such right of
set-off -may be exercised despite the provisions of § 6oa, which covers the
matter of preferences. The question very frequently arises when bankers
apply deposit balances upon matured obligations of customers. If such
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application is made within four months of the time when the customer goes
into bankruptcy, the contention that a preference has resulted is almost
inevitable. The Massey case decided that under such circumstances there
was not a voidable preference. There the deposits were made in the ordinary
course of business, and the court carefully guards against expressing an
opinion as to what the result would be in case of fraud or collusion between
the depositor and bank.
In Studley v. Boylston National Bank, 33 Sup. Ct. 8o6, decided June 9,
1913, the Supreme Court had under consideration the same general question
under facts somewhat different. In that case notes -had been paid, within the
four months' period, by the depositor by his own checks drawn upon his
account with the payee bank. It 'was contended that the drawing of the
checks made the case one of "payment" instead of set-off. But the court held
that the -transaction in essence was the same whether the matured notes were
charged to the account or "paid" by means of checks signed by the depositor-
borrower. The opinion is so worded as not to include within the doctrine of
the case those cases where deposits are made by the borrower not in the
ordinary course of business, but for the purpose of effecting a preference.
Where it is shown that the deposits were made for the purpose of creating a
fund so that the bank might exercise the right of set-off it seems clear from
the cases referred to that -the transaction would be declared a preference,
and therefore voidable within § 6o. Such seems to have been the situation,
in the view of the court, in Re Starkweather & Albert, 206 Fed. 797, decided
by one of the District Courts, April 25, 1913, and reported Oct, 9, I9r3.
In the last mentioned case the bankrupts had on deposit, on the day their
note matured, just a little more than sufficient to cover -the amount due
thereon, but there were then outstanding unpresented checks, to pay 'which
there would not -have been sufficient funds in the deposit account if the note
were charged off.- It was therefore agreed between the bank and, depositor
that the latter's check on the account should be given to cover the said note,
post-dated four days in order that the outstanding checks might be paid when
presented and other funds brought in to make up the shortage in the account
caused by honoring said checks. At the expiration of the four days the note
was retired and the check charged to the account. On application by -the
trustee to set aside the transaction as a voidable preference the court held, at
least so far as the deposit was made for purpose of taking care of the post-
dated check. and not for general purposes, it was tantamount to a payment
direct to the bank. and was voidable as a preference. The court, however,
went further and declared that the entire transaction, so far as it affected the
payment of the note, was preferential and voidable. The court said that "the
bank did not stand upon its right of set-off. It simply threatened to exercise
that right. The matter terminated, however, on the basis of voluntary pay-
ments by Starkweather & Albert, in giving checks which were received by the
bank as payments. While the distinction seems narrow between a payment
resulting from the exercise of the right of set-off and a payment by check
given in the presence of the power by the bank to exercise this right of set-
off and application, yet the legal distinction exists, in that in the one instance
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the act is that of the bank, and in the other that of the debtor." That the
court was wrong on this feature of the case is clear from the Studley case.
So far as there was money deposited for the particular purpose of paying
the note, even though it may have been in the indirect manner of providing
a fund to meet-the check which paid the note, there would seem to have been
a preference. But in going beyond that the court was wrong. R. W. A.
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